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DOES A CULTURAL BARRIER TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY TRADE EXIST? THE JAPANESE
EXAMPLE
TosimKo TAKENAKA*
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the so-called "cultural barrier to intellectual prop-
erty trade?" No definition for this phrase readily came to me
when I began exploring the topic. Japanese intellectual prop-
erty scholars and professionals strongly suspect that their U.S.
counterparts, who find institutional or economic explanations
for discrepancies between European and American business
customs, nevertheless tend to attribute the differences be-
tween Japanese and American business practices to cultural
differences. Three popular arguments offered to substantiate
this "cultural barrier to intellectual property trade" theory are:
(1) the application of the concepts of competition and mo-
nopoly to intangibles such as technology and ideas is foreign
to Asian culture; (2) Japanese imitation of basic technological
innovation is rooted in Japanese culture; and (3) theJapanese
only utilize the basic technology developed by U.S. inventors
and do not add any new innovations themselves.
This paper proposes that the first argument does not ap-
ply to Japan. An analysis of historical developments reveals
that technology and idea monopoly systems existed long
before Japan adopted a modem intellectual property system
similar to the European and American models. Wfith regard to
the second and third arguments, the Japanese Patent Office's
survey on patent applications for semiconductor technology
reveals that U.S. and European inventors produced early
breakthrough inventions. This suggests thatJapanese techno-
logical development policy tends to focus on the manufacture
and application of technologies rather than on the creation of
basic innovative technologies. However, the difficulties Euro-
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pean countries faced in achieving technological break-
throughs implies that a cultural barrier cannot explain the dif-
ference. Finally, Japan's failure to excel at innovation does
not create a barrier to intellectual property trade. License ne-
gotiations in the form of royalty payments for U.S. and Euro-
pean technologies, and/or grant-backs of improvements, tend
to correct any trade imbalance caused by the Japanese focus
on application and manufacture of technologies. In short, this
paper argues that, upon close examination, the assumptions
underpinning the "cultural barrier to intellectual property
trade" theory demonstrate that the differences in Japanese
and Western intellectual property practices are not grounded
in culture. Furthermore, this paper argues that cultural differ-
ences do not create a barrier to intellectual property trade.
II. PRE-MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMS IN JAPAN
Despite the allegations made by proponents of the first
theory, a monopoly system for technology has long been a fea-
ture of Japanese regulatory structures. Central and local gov-
ernments granted monopolies or patents for technology even
before Japan adopted a modern intellectual property system in
1871.1 These pre-modern systems generally had the same ef-
fect as the current intellectual property system in maintaining
an orderly market and encouraging innovation by providing
subsidies or granting monopolies.
The first pre-modern system in Japan, a subsidy system
rather than a patent system, developed when craftsmen distin-
guished themselves from farmers as independent profession-
als. A primitive feudal system developed between the third
and fifth centuries.2 At that time, most people were farmers
supplying agricultural labor to their feudal landlords. They
fabricated their own tools and other implements in the inter-
vals between their farm tasks. As a routine of agricultural la-
bor was established, and people began to differentiate among
labor tasks, landlords began to exempt those farmers who were
1. Senbairyaku Kisoku [Exclusive Sales Summary Rule), Rule No. 170 of
1871 as suspended by Law No. 105 of 1872, and replaced with Senbai Tok-
kyo J6rei [Exclusive Patent Law] (1988).
2. The primitive feudal system, called be, was adopted from Korea and
China. MOTO-O ENDO, 1 NIHON SHOKUNIN SHI NO KENKYO (STUDY OF His-
TORY OFJAPANESE CRAFrsMANsHIP] 52 (1985).
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good craftsmen from agricultural duties so that they could
craft tools and create a framework for greater specialization.3
This arrangement established craftsmen as independent pro-
fessionals.
In addition, from the fifth to seventh centuries, landlords
encouraged the dissemination of Korean and Chinese technol-
ogy by inviting craftsmen from these nations to Japan" and
offering them land in exchange for teaching their skills to lo-
cals in the landlord's territory. After the emperor's family
seized power from local landlords and established a central
government in the seventh century, the government began to
retain the best skilled craftsmen and architects. These
craftsmen and architects worked at government-owned facto-
ries (kan kbo) as low-ranking bureaucrats (tomonobe). In ef-
fect, Japan had already established a subsidy system for devel-
opers of technological innovation by this time.5 Through this
subsidy system, the government led the initiative in technologi-
cal development.
In the twelfth to sixteenth centuries, a monopoly system
called za (literally, "seat") was developed for the protection of
developers of innovation. 6 The za system was essentially a mo-
nopoly granted by the landlords or local governments to a pro-
fession that had regained power as the central government de-
clined. Under the auspices of the za, craftsmen were granted
the right to ply their trades. In order to join, a craftsman was
required to have a patent from his landlord granting him the
right, for example, to build and sell fittings. The za system was
characterized by strong feudal ties between craftsmen and
their landlords. Although craftsmen enjoyed the benefits of a
monopoly in their local markets, they served their landlords by
providing compulsory labor. The patent for practicing the
craft could be inherited by family members.
After the sengoku period, the feudal lords (daimyo) dis-
solved the za system during the civil law era in response to de-
mands from the craftsmen and merchants who were excluded
3. These artisans are called takumi Id. at 54.
4. These foreign craftsmen were called tdito to distinguish them from
takumi. Id.
5. By the tenth century, the government had created a system for mono-
polizing and centralizing the most advanced technology available at that
time. ENDo, supra note 2, at 66.
6. ENDo, supra note 2, at 74.
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from the market. A new type of monopoly system, called
nakama (literally, "association"), arose in the seventeenth to
eighteenth centuries after the Shogunate government at Edo
(Edo Bakufu) gained control of the nation.7 Although the
nakama was also a patent system controlled by the central gov-
ernment, it differed from the za system in that it was a self-
regulated association voluntarily adopted by the craftsmen as a
group. The za system, on the other hand, was characterized by
a one-on-one relationship between each craftsman and his
landlord.8
Both the nakama system and the European merchants'
guild system were voluntarily adopted by professionals in an
effort to regulate the market. Like the European guild system,
the nakama system regulated the number of members in each
profession as a means of securing monopoly benefits. The
nakama members paid taxes to the central government, which,
in return, policed the market to exclude nonmembers.9
One important role of the nakama system was to maintain
and improve the quality of craftsmanship. 10 For example, the
nakama set standards for the materials and tools that the mem-
bers used, and prohibited members from working after dark.
In addition, the nakama created an extensive apprenticeship
system to train young craftsmen. Although the master's son
often inherited the mastership, in principle the best-skilled
craftsman who satisfied all the training requirements usually
succeeded to the mastership. 1 The most experienced and
skilled masters were elected as leaders, so masters and appren-
tices worked very hard to improve their skills. The nakama also
protected trade secrets by preventing apprentices from work-
ing for other masters. Members were prohibited from sharing
technological expertise, allowing them to concentrate on im-
proving their craftsmanship. In short, the nakama functioned
like a patent system in that it encouraged innovation.
7. ENDO, supra note 2, at 78.
8. ENDO, supra note 2, at 79.
9. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, 1 KOCYO SHOYCJKEN HYAKUNEN Si-11 [CNTE.
NARY HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY SYSTEM] 8 (1984).
10. ENDO, supra note 5, at 89.
11. The mastership is called kabu (literally, "stock"), or oyakata ken (liter-
ally, the "right of mastership"). ENDO, supra note 2, at 99.
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The nakama also served as a trademark system,' 2 as its
rules prevented non-members from representing their work as
that of a nakarna member. It thus maintained market order by
eliminating possible confusion as to the origin of goods. Fur-
thermore, the nakama provided standards that ensured the
quality of goods made and sold by members.
In addition, the Edo Bakufu granted each local govern-
ment patents for making and selling local products unique to
the region.13 In effect, local governments created laboratories
for the invention and improvement of local products and sold
the products directly to the public through exclusive dealing
offices. In certain respects, the Edo Bakufu system closely paral-
leled a modem patent system. After the Mey'i government
came to power in 1868, the national patent system that was
eventually adopted drew extensively from the principles of the
Edo Bakufu system.
When the Meiji government first overthrew the Edo
Bakufu, it abolished all feudal patent systems and dissolved the
nakama in order to remove restrictions from the market.14
The result, however, was a chaotic market situation. The Mefi
government realized it needed to create a new patent system
in order to centralize patent power.' 5 In order to achieve its
goal of replacing the local government structures (han) with
new local governments under greater central governmental
control (ken), the Meiji government sought to eliminate all rev-
enues flowing to the har, especially monopoly profits. The
presence of significant trade-barriers within the national mar-
ket, resulting from local monopolies, reinforced the govern-
ment's desire to abolish local monopoly systems. This reason-
ing further accelerated the Meiji government's adoption of a
modem intellectual property system.
Although the Edo Bakufu encouraged the development of
craftsmanship, it discouraged innovation. Thus, even today,
the encouragement of innovation is considered alien to Japa-
nese culture. For this reason, Japan's decision to adopt a mod-
em intellectual property system is often attributed to foreign
12. JAPANESE PATENT OFncE, supra note 9, at 8.
13. JAPA.NESE PATENT OMicE, supra note 9, at 8.
14. JAPANESE PATr OMICE, supra note 9, at 15.
15. JAPANESE PATENT OMCE, supra note 12, at 23.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
1996-1997]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
pressure. 16 However, an intellectual property system would
not have taken root in Japan without a domestic market need.
The vast differences between the old and modem patent sys-
tems became apparent,17and Japan realized that the nakama
had to be replaced in order to create an orderly market and
reward innovation. 18 The major difference between the
nakama and the modern patent system is that the modem sys-
tem grants a patent to a particular technology for a limited
time, whereas the nakama granted a monopoly to a profession
indefinitely. Essentially, the new system shifted the main pur-
pose away from securing privileges for the ruling class and to-
ward encouraging technological innovation and industrial de-
velopment.
In short, both monopolies relating to technology and sys-
tems designed to encourage innovation and maintain an or-
derly market have existed since technology-based professions
were established in Japan. When foreign countries pressed Ja-
pan to adopt an intellectual property system, Japan was ready.
Although the old patent system differed from the modern pat-
ent system, the maintenance of market order through a mo-
nopoly system has been the common goal of both the pre-
modem and modem intellectual property systems. Clearly, the
use of a monopoly system for technology and ideas is not for-
eign to Japan.
III. JAPAN'S LACK OF INNOVATION IS UNRELATED TO CULTURE
The second and third theories might be valid if it could
be shown that Japanese technology fails to achieve the stan-
dard of technological innovation attained in both the United
States and Europe. Using semiconductor technology as an ex-
ample, a Japanese Patent Office survey indicates that early
breakthroughs in technology were made by non-Japanese ap-
16. MIYAKE, ToKiyo, HONNSHITSU TO SONO SHUHEN [TIE PATENT: ESSEN-
TIAL AND RELATED ISSuES] 17 (1981). But see, JA'ANESE PATENT OFFICE, supra
note 9, at 8. Although the Edo Shogunate published a rule prohibiting in-
ventions of luxury articles, the rule did not apply to ordinary products and
tools. Furthermore, the Shogunate promoted the invention of unique local
products.
17. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, supra note 12, at 16. In the original bill in-
troducing the patent system, a patent was called shinki kabu (literally, "novel
stock") to distinguish it from old patents under the nakama system.
18. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, supra note 12, at 40.
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plicants, namely U.S. and European inventors. Figure I illus-
trates the key inventions that led to the development of a new
diffusion process, one of the basic technologies used in manu-
facturing semiconductors.' 9 In Figure 1, the black circles indi-
cate the inventions filed by non-Japanese applicants and white
circles indicate inventions filed by Japanese applicants. The
statistics demonstrate that most early inventions were con-
ceived by non-Japanese applicants. As the technology ma-
tured, however, the number of Japanese inventions based on
this technology increased. This suggests thatJapanese contri-
butions are made in the areas of manufacturing and applica-
tion technologies, rather than in basic technologies.
Figure 2, which indicates the number of patent applica-
tions for diffusion technology filed by non-Japanese and Japa-
nese applicants alike, also supports this conclusion.20
Although Japanese applicants required ten years to catch up
with American and European technological standards, the
number of Japanese applications soon surpassed the number
of non-Japanese applications. Although American and Euro-
pean applicants maintain a significant lead in the area of basic
technology, their edge in application and manufacture of
technology is not as great.
Figure 3 indicates the number of applications for open-
tube diffusion equipment, a technology considered essential
for the mass-manufacture of semiconductor devices. 23 In only
five years, Japanese applicants achieved parity with U.S. and
European technologies. The number of applications for pat-
ents to develop equipment and methods to test semiconductor
devices, a typical manufacturing technology used to improve
the yield of products, appear in Figure 4, which shows that,
from the beginning, Japanese applications outnumber non-
Japanese applications.22 In short, while Japanese companies
lag in the area of breakthrough technology, their contribu-
tions in perfecting the technology and in the mass-production
of semiconductors are significant.
19. JAPANESE PATENT OFmicE, To~iuo KARA MITA Gijtrrsu Daxeo [TEctmo-
LOGICAL TRmDS IN VIEW OF PATENTS: SEuIcoNDuarOR FIELD] 60 (1975).
20. Id. at 60.
21. Id. at 67.
22. I& at 250.
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While Japan does focus on the application and manufac-
ture of technologies rather than on basic technologies, one
must nevertheless question whether this phenomenon has a
cultural basis. One commentator has attempted to tie the lag
in Japanese technological innovation to its educational sys-
tem, 23 arguing that the system has always focused on reverse-
engineering and technology translation. Under Japan's tradi-
tional educational system, an apprentice learned his craft by
copying his master. Similarly, students and engineers in the
Meiji era learned about American and European technology
by copying imported products. This tradition of imitation con-
tinued in the national universities and laboratories established
by the Meiji government. According to this commentator, this
history explains the lack of innovative technology in Japan.
Such an apprenticeship system is not, however, unique to
Japan. The German educational system for engineers, for ex-
ample, is still based on the apprenticeship model, yet Germany
has managed to produce a number of distinguished scientists
and inventors. Even if Japan's technological focus is partially
attributable to the apprenticeship system, this apprenticeship
system is rooted more in Japan's economic and political sys-
tems rather than its cultural heritage. This is supported by the
fact that both Japan and Germany have historical and religious
cultures that distinguish them from the rest of the West, yet
only Germany excels at innovation.
Japan's sociological structure is also said to be a factor in
the decision not to focus on innovation. Leading Japanese re-
searchers who have abandoned Japanese academia often sug-
gest that the difficulty of being creative in the rigid university
system is one of the main reasons behind their departures.24
Adventurous researchers fail to thrive in Japanese universities
where authority and seniority are valued and rewarded over
creativity and ability. Because this rigid structure is also char-
acteristic of European academic institutions, however, it can-
not be seen as a uniquely Japanese cultural phenomena.
23. FUMIO SHIMURA, HAITEKU KoxKA NIHON NO CHITEKI SENTAKU [INTEL,
LIGENT CHOICE BY HIGH TECHNOLOGY ORIENTED COUNTRY-JAPAN] 28-60
(1993).
24. Clyde Haberman, Japan Asks Why Scientists Go West to Thrive, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1987, at A9, cited in FRED WARSHoFsKY, THE CHIP WAR: THE
BATTLE FOR THE WoRL OF ToMoRRoW 111 (1989).
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In comparing Japanese and American cultures, another
commentator claims that the Japanese value diligence and ex-
perience as much as innovation and entrepreneurship. 5 Japa-
nese values may encourage inventors to concentrate on devel-
oping improvements rather than on creating something com-
pletely new. Yet these cultural "differences" cannot be seen as
the definitive cause for Japan's failure to focus on innovative
technology, because Europeans also esteem diligence and ex-
perience.
The Japanese tendency to concentrate on the application
and manufacture of technologies is exacerbated by the govern-
ment's research and development [R&D] and industrial devel-
opment policies. As Dr. David C. Hill accurately points out,
history demonstrates that Japan's technological development
is characterized by a strong bond between the government and
the private sector.26 This bond was reinforced during the Meiji
period when the govemment played a major role in ensuring
that American and European technologies were transferred to
private companies.2 7 The government managed the transfer
of technology in two steps: first, after identifying key technolo-
gies, it built national laboratories and manufacturing plants
that implemented the technologies, using the help of Ameri-
can and European instructors. Second, the plants and labora-
tories were then sold on the market place, and the buyers re-
tained the government engineers. These privatized plants and
laboratories, run by former govemment officials, became the
foundation of Japanese industry.28
Since the Meiji period, the Japanese government's R&D
policy has centered around the application of transferred tech-
25. FRED WARSHOFSKy, THE CHIP WAR: THE BATi. FOR THE WORLD OF
ToMoRRow 89 (1989).
26. David C. Hill, Remarks at the Conference on the Culture and Eco-
nomics of Participation in an International Intellectual Property Regime,
Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, New York University
School of Law (Mar. 1-2, 1996).
27. Kenji Sasaju et al., Ke5goka ni Hatashita Kang'6seisahu no Yahuuari:
Ndmushd Shokokei Gishi o Megutte [The Role of Industrial Promotion Poliy in the
Industrialization Case of Technical Craftsmen in the Ministry of Agriculture], in
GIUTrSU NO SHAKAism [HIsToRY OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEv'OPMEN'r 237
(Sasaki Junnosuke ed., 1983).
28. Id. at 239.
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nologies, rather than the creation of new technologies.2 9 The
government investigates future technological developments
and prepares domestic companies to utilize these technolo-
gies.30 Some commentators attribute the success of Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI] to its abil-
ity to identify key areas of technology and, subsequently, to
focus the technological development of Japanese industry in
those areas.31
Government leadership in the transfer, application, and
manufacture of technology is not unique to Japanese policy. It
is well settled among historians that shifts in commercial and
industrial policy have occurred during different historical peri-
ods.3 2 The patent system was originally developed by the Brit-
ish government in the late sixteenth century in order to en-
courage the transfer of technology from the Continent. In or-
der to achieve technological parity, the United Kingdom
focused its R&D efforts on the application and manufacture of
transferred technologies. However, once the United Kingdom
became a technology leader, it altered its policies in order to
prevent its own technology from being transferred to other
countries. 33 When countries on the Continent, particularly
Germany and Switzerland, led innovation in the chemical in-
dustry, the United Kingdom responded by removing chemical
29. Yukihiko Kiyokawa, Nihon no Gjutsu Hatten Sono Tokushitsu to Gan-i
[Progress in Technology in Japan: Its Characteristics and Implications], in GiJUTSU
NO SHAKAISHI [HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT] 288 (Sasaki Jun-
nosuke ed., 1983).
30. For example, in the 1950s, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry [MITI] assumed responsibility for the transfer of key technologies
as a means of restoring Japanese industry destroyed in the wake of the Sec-
ond World War. Like the Meiji Government, MITI implemented special laws
designed to promote key industries. It identified and secured access to key
technologies for leadingJapanese industrial companies. By doing so, MITI
ensured that new technology would take root and prove fruitful forJapanese
industry. This project produced a significant number of improvement pat-
ents as reflected by the number of patent applications made by Japanese
industry in the late 1950s and 1960s. (See Figures I to 4 discussed above). See
MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, VOL. No. 6, TsusulcO
SANGY SEISAKU SHI [GOVERNMENT PoLIcy HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INDUSTRY] 587 (1990).
31. WARSHOFSKY, supra note 25, at 115.
32. AIo OKOUCHI, HATSUMEI K61 TO GijuTsu Koso [INVENTrVE AcTivi.
TIES AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN] 8 (1992).
33. Id. at 151.
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substances from the list of patentable subject matter. This pol-
icy encouraged British industry to develop patent alternatives
to German manufacturing methods as well as to improve
chemical substances themselves.14 The United States also fo-
cused on the application and manufacture of European tech-
nologies until the beginning of this century.3 5
In short, Japan's focus on application and manufacture of
technologies is unrelated to culture. The policy is a means of
achieving technological parity wvith advanced nations while as-
suming minimal risk.36 Because Japan's access to foreign cur-
rency wvas limited after the Meiji Restoration and the Second
World War, it had to find an efficient means of catching up
with the United States and Europe technologically. Invest-
ment in basic technology simply did not make sense forJapan.
IV. JAPAN'S LACK OF INNOVATION DoEs NOT CREATE .-aN
INTELLEUAL PROPERTY TRADE BARRmR
Japan's inability to match the United States in technologi-
cal creativity has not created a barrier to intellectual property
trade. Japanese technological innovation is not simply about
copying--its focus is on adaptation and application.37 Key for-
eign technologies are adapted to domestic needs, and techno-
logical improvements add value to foreign inventions. As
shown above, Japan has made significant contributions to
semiconductor technology through its focus on the applica-
tion and manufacture of technology. Although innovation is
seemingly valued above application and manufacture, innova-
tive technologies often require further development to be-
come commercially viable.3 8 Such technologies will not con-
tribute to industry unless translated into commercially viable
34. Id. at 163.
35. Id. at 93-94.
36. Id. at 3. The author identified three entrepreneurs' strategies for
dealing with technology developed by others: (1) ignore the technology; (2)
imitate and improve the technology, or (3) develop alternative technology
independent of the new technology. Entrepreneurs %iishing to catch up
with the technological leaders in the short-term while assuming minimal risk
would choose the second option. The author concluded that in choosing
from among these options, one should consider business strategy, techno-
logical basis, and resources. I&L
37. SI-mntRA, supra note 23, at 28 (1993).
38. OKoucmu, supra note 32, at 42.
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products. WithoutJapan's application and manufacturing ca-
pabilities, the mass-production of semiconductors would have
been significantly delayed.
Furthermore, these Japanese technologies became avail-
able to American industry royalty-free through cross-licensing
with the basic technologies.39 Any excess value that may be
derived from enhancements to basic technologies is paid off in
royalties to U.S. and European inventors.40 Although Figure 5
indicates that Japan's technology export rate has steadily in-
creased to match its import rate,41 technology imported from
the United States and Europe significantly exceeds levels of
Japanese exports, as shown in Figures 6(a) through 6(e). 42 In
addition to permitting royalty-free licensing of technologies,
Japanese companies have consistently paid licensing fees for
the transfer of technology. When individual Japanese compa-
nies could not afford royalty payments, MITI responded by en-
acting mechanical and electronic industry promotion laws to
assist with royalty payments. 43 Rather than simply pirating the
technology, Japan employed a strategy that enabled it to ob-
tain the technology legally, and to improve patents as a means
of reducing the royalty costs via cross-licensing.
Japan has been criticized for its narrow claim interpreta-
tion of Japanese patents.44 Yet this narrow claim interpreta-
tion has never acted as an intellectual property trade barrier
because Japanese companies pay royalties regardless of con-
39. OKoucmn, supra note 32, at 98. The number of technology exchange
agreements between Japanese and foreign companies in the electrical indus-
try has steadily increased since 1965. See OKoVcHI, supra note 32, at 107
n.54.
40. OKOUcHI, supra note 32, at 175.
41. TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INFORMATION DIVISION, GENERAL COORDINA-
TION DEPARTMENT, AGENCY OF INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, TRENDS
IN PRINCIPAL INDICATORS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AcmTrIES INJAPAN
33 (1994).
42. Id. at 34-35.
43. MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 30, at
549.
44. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXEcUTvE SUMMARY IN INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: U.S. COMPANIES' PATENT EXPERIENCES IN JAPAN 5
(July 1993). However, the most recent case law indicates a move towcards
more generous protection. Toshiko Takenaka, New Policy in Interprelingjapa-
nese Patents, CASRIP Newsletter (CASRIP, U. WASH., Seattle), Spring/Sum-
mer 1996, at 3.
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THE JAPANESE EXAMPLE
trary patent determinations. Recently, the Tokyo District
Court held that Texas Instruments' integrated circuit manu-
facturing process patent did not cover integration using more
recent technology such as MOSFET and LOCOS. 45 As a result
of this decision, Japanese courts could have interpreted all pio-
neer invention patents to cover only disclosed embodiments,
thereby excluding all future developments. Despite this hold-
ing, Japanese electronics companies have chosen to pay royal-
ties for basic patents to Texas Instruments and other U.S. com-
panies because they value and respect the importance of U.S.
inventions as one of the basic building-blocks of current Japa-
nese technology.
Those who disparage Japanese industry for its focus on
the application and manufacture of technologies may simply
have different values. A pioneering inventor who breaks new
ground may find it difficult to accept that any subsequent im-
provements could be as valuable as the initial discovery. Yet a
new material or product is often not commercially successful
without improvements. Japan's contributions to the applica-
tion and manufacture of technologies should be properly and
fairly evaluated. The talents and facilities required for the
commercial development of a basic innovation are often dif-
ferent from those required for application and manufacture,
and one company or country cannot excel at every expertise. 46
Therefore, U.S. industry should appreciate the benefits of the
division of labor existing between the United States and Eu-
rope on the one hand and Japan on the other.
A company pioneering a new invention tends to believe
that it will obtain a monopoly for the manufacture of the mate-
rial or device that it created. This expectation would not be
realistic, however, under an intellectual property system that
refuses to grant monopolies to manufacturers. Instead, the
modem system encourages newcomers to enter the market by
allowing them to improve technology. The goal of the mod-
em intellectual property regime is not to secure monopoly
privileges for inventors, but to encourage innovation by bal-
ancing the interests of pioneering inventors against those of
45. Fujitsu v. Texas Instruments, Judgment of Tokyo Trial Court, August
31, 1994, reported in HANm JIH6 (No. 1510) 35 (1995); HANmE1 TAMtLrzu
(No. 862) 108 (1995), affd Tokyo High Court, Sept. 10, 1997.
46. OKoucmn, supra note 32, at 56.
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competitors eager to enter the market by improving innovative
technologies.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to popular belief, technology monopolies have
always existed in Japan and are not foreign to Japanese cul-
ture. Japan chose to adopt a modem intellectual property sys-
tem as a means of filling the void left by the removal of the
pre-modern Japanese intellectual property system. Although
U.S. and European technological innovation remains unsur-
passed, Japan's decision to focus on the application and im-
provement of basic technology cannot be attributed to its cul-
ture, nor can its choice be seen as a barrier to intellectual
property trade.
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